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Caprino: Criminal Conspiracy and Lesser Included Offense Jury Instructions

CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY AND LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE
JURY INSTRUCTIONS: UNITED STATES V. LAPOINTE, 690 F.3D
434 (6TH CIR. 2012)
Nicholas F. Caprino∗

I. INTRODUCTION
Enforcement of criminal conspiracy laws is only effective if
supported by a proficient understanding of the laws’ underlying policies
and purposes in the Unites States’ crime prevention framework.
Criminal conspiracy convictions should not be imposed to punish or
prevent the substantive crimes they facilitate.1 Rather, they are meant to
deter the collaborative acts and preparation that make the commission of
a crime more efficient, effective, and likely to succeed.2 It is the
agreement between multiple actors to support various objectives
necessary to complete a crime that enhances the danger to society
beyond a lone actor preparing for criminal activity.3 Only once
attorneys and judges understand the policy behind conspiracy can they
correctly apply it to lesser included offense jury instructions.
In United States v. LaPointe, the defendant, James LaPointe, was
accused of involvement with an oxycodone distribution ring.4 At the
end of the trial, he requested an instruction that would allow the jury to
convict on the lesser included offense of conspiracy to possess
oxycodone (without intent to distribute).5 The jury would only be able
to convict on conspiracy to possess (the lesser included conspiracy) if it
found that he satisfied the elements of conspiracy to possess, but not the
elements of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute (the greater
conspiracy).6 The district court denied the request, and the jury
convicted LaPointe of conspiring to possess with the intent to
distribute.7 The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the lower court
∗ Associate Member, 2012–2013 University of Cincinnati Law Review. I would like to thank
my wife, Laura Caprino, for all the support she has given me throughout law school.
1. See United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 86 (1915).
2. See id. at 88; Neal Kumar Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1307, 1309–10 (2003);
see generally Jens David Ohlin, Group Think: The Law of Conspiracy and Collective Reason, 98 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 147, 169–70 (2007) (providing a comprehensive overview of criminal
conspiracy law).
3. See Ohlin, supra note 2, at 169–70.
4. United States v. LaPointe, 690 F.3d 434, 438 (6th Cir. 2012).
5. Id. at 438–39.
6. Id. at 439.
7. Id. at 438–39. LaPointe was also convicted of attempting to possess, which he challenged
separately on the basis that he failed to take a “substantial step” towards possession. Id. at 443–44. The
Appeals court affirmed the district court’s conviction on this count. Id. at 444.

257

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2014

1

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 6

258

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 82

should have granted the defendant’s request for a jury instruction
because conspiracy to possess is a lesser included offense of conspiracy
to possess with intent to distribute.8 In doing so, the Sixth Circuit
explicitly pointed out the split between the First and Tenth Circuits and
adopted the First Circuit’s approach.9
Part II of this note will outline the standards and elements of criminal
conspiracy as applied to LaPointe and will also introduce the
requirements for a lesser included offense instruction. Part III will
outline the opinion of LaPointe, and Part IV will discuss the Circuits’
analyses of conspiracies with multiple objectives, the intent required to
convict on conspiracy, as well as the issue of avoiding injustice in lesser
included conspiracy scenarios. Finally, Part V will conclude, finding
that while the Sixth Circuit may have reached the appropriate
disposition, the court mischaracterized the nature of the circuit split and
failed to solidify a clear and definitive break from the Tenth Circuit’s
incorrect analysis of the issue.
II. STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND RELATED CASES
A. Conspiracy in Federal Drug Cases
21 U.S.C. § 846 governs conspiracy in federal drug trafficking cases
and simply states: “Any person who attempts or conspires to commit
any offense defined in this title shall be subject to the same penalties as
those prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object
of the attempt or conspiracy.” What constitutes conspiracy under § 846
is left to federal courts’ common law interpretation.10 Generally, the
elements of conspiracy include 1) an agreement between two or more
people, 2) the accused’s knowledge of the conspiracy and intent to join,
and 3) the accused’s voluntary participation in the conspiracy.11 While
some laws require an overt act to prove the agreement element, courts
have held that § 846 does not require such proof; instead, the
government need only prove the agreement itself.12 The prosecution
8. Id. at 443.
9. Id. at 441–42.
10. See, e.g., United States v. Bland, 653 F.2d 989, 996 (5th Cir. 1981); United Stated v. Turner,
319 F.3d 716, 721 (5th Cir. 2003).
11. Turner, 319 F.3d at 721.
12. United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 15 (1994). For example, 18 U.S.C. § 371 explicitly
requires an overt act to demonstrate agreement to join a conspiracy, while 21 U.S.C. § 846 requires no
such proof. United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 86 (1915) (holding an overt act is required under
§ 37 of the Criminal Code); Statute of Limitations in Prosecution for Conspiracy to Commit Offense
Against or to Defraud United States 18 U.S.C.A. § 371, 68 A.L.R. FED. 628, § 3 (2011) [hereinafter
Statute of Limitations] (stating that the statute addressed in Rabinowich (§ 37) is a predecessor to 18
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does not need to demonstrate a formal agreement. For example, “a tacit
or mutual understanding to engage in a common plan is sufficient” to
prove an agreement,13 as opposed to an overt act symbolizing the
agreement.
Intent to conspire is necessary to convict on conspiracy, but this does
not mean that proof of specific intent to distribute drugs is required.14 If
a defendant agrees to a conspiracy with knowledge of the distribution
and intent to be part of the conspiracy to distribute, that defendant may
be guilty of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute even if the
defendant did not intend to actually distribute or possess.15 The
defendant does not have to actively distribute or intend to actually
distribute.16 Rather, he must simply intend to join and further a
conspiracy that has an objective of distribution.17 Although knowledge
of the conspiracy’s primary objective is required to show intent,
knowledge alone does not necessarily equate to intent to join the
conspiracy.18 For example, “mere knowledge” by a defendant that other
actors intend to actively distribute drugs is not enough to demonstrate
intent to join a conspiracy to distribute drugs.19
Further, a single conspiracy may have multiple objectives.20 The
U.S. Supreme Court, in United States v. Ingram, solidified this concept
in U.S. conspiracy law.21 There is a difference between a conspiracy
with multiple objectives and separate conspiracies with different
objectives.22 If the conspiracy sets out to complete a primary objective,
and more minor objectives are completed for the furtherance of the
primary objective, this constitutes a conspiracy with multiple
objectives.23 For instance, possessing a drug is a necessary minor
objective to achieve the greater objective of distributing that drug. This
scheme illustrates a single conspiracy with the objectives of possession

U.S.C. § 371).
13. United States v. Collins, 78 F.3d 1021, 1037 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing United States v. Ellzey,
874 F.2d 324, 328 (6th Cir. 1989)).
14. See Bland, 653 F.2d at 996; United States v. Diaz, 655 F.2d 580, 584 (5th Cir. 1981).
15. See Bland, 653 F.2d at 996; Diaz, 655 F.2d at 584.
16. See Bland, 653 F.2d at 996; Diaz, 655 F.2d at 584.
17. See Bland, 653 F.2d at 996; Diaz, 655 F.2d at 584.
18. Ingram v. United States, 360 U.S. 672, 678 (1959) (citing Direct Sales Co. v. United States,
319 U.S. 703, 711–12 (1943)) (finding that a conspiracy to primarily conceal a crime may have a minor
objective to evade federal taxes); Diaz, 655 F.2d at 584.
19. United States v. Boidi, 568 F.3d 24, 30 (1st Cir. 2009).
20. Ingram, 360 U.S. at 679–80 (citing United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 86 (1915)).
21. Id.
22. See United States v. LaPointe, 690 F.3d 434, 441 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Ingram, 360 U.S. at
679).
23. Ingram, 360 U.S. at 679–80 (citing Rabinowich, 238 U.S. at 86); LaPointe, 690 F.3d at 441.
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and distribution.24 On the other hand, if a defendant’s possession of
drugs is wholly unrelated to any distribution, then the conspiracy to
possess the drugs would be wholly separate from the conspiracy to
distribute.25
Finally, actual possession or distribution does not automatically lead
to guilt on conspiracy to possess or distribute.26 It is not enough to
commit the substantive offense. If a defendant is charged with
conspiracy to possess, simple possession alone will not amount to
conspiracy.27 The defendant must agree to join, have knowledge of the
conspiracy’s objective, and intend to conspire. Only when those
elements are met is the policy behind conspiracy law achieved.28
Punishing the substantive crime does not go far enough to separately
punish the agreements that potentially make the crime more efficient,
more successful, and more dangerous to society.29 In Rabinowich, the
Supreme Court demonstrated why punishment of the agreement, wholly
separate from the substantive offense, is necessary.30 The Supreme
Court characterized an agreement to do a criminal act as “an offense of
the gravest character” because of the enhanced injury to the public.31
The coordinated action between co-conspirators makes conspiracy more
difficult for the state to detect and prevent than crimes by sole actors.32
In addition, conspiracies go further in “educating and preparing the
conspirators for further habitual criminal practices.”33 The Supreme
Court understood the importance of the distinction between the
substantive crime and the conspiracy to commit that crime in
Rabinowich, and that distinction continues to be an integral part of
courts’ conspiracy analysis today.34
24. See LaPointe, 690 F.3d at 441.
25. See id. (quoting United States v. Garcia, 27 F.3d 1009, 1015 (5th Cir. 1994)); infra text
accompanying notes 140–141.
26. See United States v. Boidi, 568 F.3d 24, 29 (1st Cir. 2009).
27. See id.
28. See id. See generally Katyal, supra note 2, at 1309–10.
29. See Ohlin, supra note 2, at 169–70; Katyal, supra note 2, at 1309–10.
30. United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 88 (1915) (ruling on a conspiracy to conceal
property from a bankruptcy trustee).
31. Id.
32. See id.
33. Id.
34. See id. It should be noted that Rabinowich does not directly analyze conspiracy as it is put
forth in the statute at issue in this Note (i.e., 21 U.S.C. § 846). Rather, the case addresses conspiracy in
§ 37 of the Criminal Code, which is a predecessor to 18 U.S.C. § 371. See Statute of Limitations, supra
note 12, at 3. Section 37 does differ from § 846. For example, § 371 requires the government to prove
an overt act of an agreement, while § 846 does not. Despite this fact, the reasoning behind conspiracy,
especially the need to distinguish it from the substantive offense, remains constant. Compare
Rabinowich, 238 U.S. at 88, with United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 15 (1994) (Shabani directly
interprets § 371 while Rabinowich does not).
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B. Standard for Lesser Included Offense Instructions
It is not unusual for a defendant to request a lesser included offense
instruction when charged with conspiracy to possess with the intent to
distribute.35 A court will instruct the jury that it is allowed to convict
the defendant of simple conspiracy to possess if the jury finds that the
elements of the lesser offense are met and if the prosecution does not
prove all of the elements of the greater offense.36 The standards for
requiring the instruction for a lesser included offense are relatively the
same in each circuit.
The First Circuit mapped out the elements required to allow a lesser
included offense instruction in United States v. Boidi.37 To allow the
instruction, 1) the lesser offense must be included in the offense
charged, 2) “a contested fact must separate the two offenses, and 3) the
evidence would permit a jury to rationally find [the defendant] guilty of
the lesser included offense and acquit him of the greater.”38 The Tenth
Circuit uses the same prongs and elaborates by explaining that a lesser
offense is included in a greater when the lesser has “some but not all of
the elements” of the greater.39 It also rephrases the second prong,
requiring a contested fact to separate the offenses by holding that “the
elements differentiating the two offenses are in dispute.”40 Although the
phrasing of the circuits is varied, the meaning behind the elements is
virtually the same.41 For the purpose of clarity, this Casenote will refer
to the prongs as 1) the “lesser offense included within the greater”
prong, 2) the “contested fact in dispute” prong, and 3) the “rational jury”
prong.
The Sixth Circuit has similar elements in a slightly reorganized way
that should not substantially affect a court’s analysis.42 The Sixth
Circuit’s first requirement is that “the elements of the lesser offense are

35. See, e.g., United States v. Boidi, 568 F.3d 24, 27 (1st Cir. 2009); Unites States v. Gilmore,
438 Fed. App’x 654, 657 (10th Cir. 2011); United States v. LaPointe, 690 F.3d 434, 438–39 (6th Cir.
2012).
36. See LaPointe, 690 F.3d at 439.
37. Boidi, 568 F.3d at 27.
38. Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (citing United States v. Ferreira, 625 F.2d 1030,
1031 (1st Cir. 1980)) (quoting Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 208 (1973) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
39. Gilmore, 438 Fed. App’x at 657 (citing United States v. Mullins, 613 F.3d 1273, 1284 (10th
Cir. 2010)).
40. Gilmore, 438 Fed. App’x at 657 (citing Mullins, 613 F.3d at 1284). The court also adds an
element to the beginning of its analysis by requiring a proper request for a jury instruction.
41. The lesser included offense prongs can be traced back to the United States Supreme Court
case, Sansone v. United States. Therefore, the analysis in every circuit should track Sansone’s. See
Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343, 349–50 (1965).
42. See United States v. LaPointe, 690 F.3d 434, 439 (6th Cir. 2012).
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identical to part of the elements of the greater.”43 This is a variation on
the First and Tenth Circuits’ phrasing of the first prong, but this prong
holds the same meaning among the three circuits. The Sixth Circuit also
requires that “the evidence would support a conviction on the lesser
offense . . . .”44 This is simply a way of stating that the jury could find
the defendant guilty on the lesser offense. It is the same as the First and
Tenth Circuits’ third prongs, except that, on its own, it does not require
the jury’s ability to acquit on the greater offense.45 That aspect is
included in the Sixth Circuit’s next prong: “the proof on the element or
elements differentiating the two crimes is sufficiently disputed so that a
jury could consistently acquit on the greater offense and convict on the
lesser.”46 This combines the First and Tenth Circuits’ second and third
prongs.47 Although there is a difference in language, all of the versions
can be traced back to a 1965 Supreme Court case that interpreted
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 31(c) and should have the same
application.48 For this reason, when addressing the three prongs, this
Casenote will refer to the organization adopted in the First and Tenth
Circuits.49
C. Boidi: Requiring Lesser Included Offense Instruction
Scott Boidi was convicted on criminal charges of embezzlement;
Racketeer, Influenced, and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)
violations; and conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute.50 At trial,
the United States presented testimony that the defendant had shared the
drugs with his wife and “uneven testimony” on whether the defendant
shared them with his other friends.51 At the appellate level, the
defendant challenged the district court’s denial of his request for a lesser
included offense jury instruction.52 The First Circuit held that
“conspiracy to possess” is a lesser included offense of “conspiracy to
43. Id. (quoting United States v. Colon, 268 F.3d 367, 373 (6th Cir. 2001)). Like the Tenth
Circuit, the Sixth Circuit also adds an element at the beginning of their analysis requiring a defendant to
properly request the jury instruction.
44. Id. at 439 (quoting Colon, 268 F.3d at 373).
45. See id. at 439; United States v. Boidi, 568 F.3d 24, 27 (1st Cir. 2009); Gilmore, 438 Fed.
App’x at 657.
46. LaPointe, 690 F.3d at 439 (quoting Colon, 268 F.3d at 373).
47. See id. at 439; Boidi, 568 F.3d at 27; Gilmore, 438 Fed. App’x at 657.
48. Sansone, 380 U.S. at 349–50.
49. This Note will continue to use the shortened descriptive names used above. Again, they are
1) the lesser offense included within the greater prong, 2) the contested fact in dispute prong, and 3)
rational jury prong.
50. Boidi, 568 F.3d at 26–27.
51. Id. at 26.
52. Id. at 27.
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possess with intent to distribute,” and the district court erred in not
granting the instruction request.53 As a result, the convictions for
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute were vacated.54
In Boidi, the government did not dispute that the substantive offense
of possession is a lesser included offense of possession with intent to
distribute, but instead argued that conspiracy to do so was entirely
distinguishable.55 The United States asserted that the agreement to
possess a drug is a wholly different agreement than one to possess with
intent to distribute, and therefore, conspiracies to do either are
completely different crimes.56
The First Circuit, rejecting the prosecution’s argument, initially
pointed out that the government’s stance on the issue had been
inconsistent, citing an instance where the prosecution had conceded that
the lesser conspiracy was included in the greater.57 The First Circuit
also recognized that several courts, including their own, had assumed
that such a lesser included instruction may be granted but had not issued
a formal holding on the point.58
In addressing the substance of the issue, the First Circuit held that the
elements of the lesser offense were included in the greater, meeting the
first prong of the lesser included offense instruction analysis.59 The
court found that “‘conspiracy to possess drugs with intent to distribute’
can easily be said to be a ‘conspiracy to possess drugs’ with one added
element, namely, that the parties also shared aim that the possessed
drugs then be distributed.”60 But the court elaborated on this factor,
requiring that the core facts of the lesser and greater offenses derive
from a common scenario.61 In other words, while a lesser included
instruction was proper here, it would not be proper in cases where a
defendant charged with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute
requests an instruction for conspiracy to simply possess based on an
agreement with different people at a different time.62
The government contended that the core facts were different and not

53. Id. at 29.
54. Id. at 32.
55. Id. at 27.
56. See id.
57. Id. at 27–28 (citing United States v. White, 972 F.2d 590, 596 (5th Cir. 1992)).
58. Id. at 28 (citing United States v. Arroyo, 546 F.3d 54, 56 (1st Cir. 2008)).
59. See id. at 28.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. (using the example “[i]f the government charges . . . conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute heroin in New York in 2004 but the evidence arguably showed only a conspiracy to possess in
San Francisco in 2007, this would call only for an instruction that the jury not convict if the government
proves a conspiracy different than that charged”).
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overlapping because different witnesses would be required to prove the
lesser conspiracy.63 The court again rejected the government’s
argument holding that “the lesser . . . offense has to be a version
of . . . the same factual scenario as the greater offense” and the only
difference is that the added element distinguishing the greater need not
be proved.64 The core facts that the government presented included
Boidi buying drugs from the dealer and sharing them with others.65
Although these facts were meant to prove conspiracy to distribute, by
their nature, they were also sufficient to prove conspiracy to possess.66
For that reason, the court declared that “[t]he witnesses that the
government chose to prove the greater offense are the proof of the lesser
included one.”67
The First Circuit then took on the final rational jury prong and asked
whether a jury could reasonably convict on the lesser offense while
acquitting on the greater.68 The government argued that the fact that the
defendant shared drugs with his wife was enough for a reasonable jury
to find that he conspired to distribute.69 The court agreed that the
defendant did indeed share the drugs with his wife, but concluded that
conspiracy to distribute is not that same as the substantive offense.70
While the defendant sharing drugs with his wife may have easily proved
actual distribution, it did not automatically follow that the defendant was
guilty of conspiracy to distribute.71 Despite carrying out the substantive
act, the defendant must agree to join, know of, and intend to participate
in the conspiracy before being convicted of conspiracy.72 Entirely
different elements are required to prove conspiracy as opposed to the
substantive crime, and a jury could find that the defendant did not
conspire to distribute, despite the fact that he actually distributed.73
Further, according to the court, it would not be unreasonable for a jury
to find that the defendant did not conspire to distribute, but did conspire
to possess based on these facts.74
The court then combined the above legal analysis with several policy

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 28–29.
Id.
See generally id. at 25–26.
See id. at 29.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
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concerns.75 First, courts are typically wary of imposing conspiracy on
low-level members of top-down organizations.76 The First Circuit
found the government’s argument particularly suspect in cases such as
this, where the prosecution could have more easily charged the
substantive crime alone, but opted for conspiracy to gain certain
advantages.77 The court then addressed the purpose of conspiracy laws,
reasoning that the purpose is not met when the intent to support a
conspiracy is absent.78 The lesser included instruction should be
allowed to ensure that the defendant is being charged with a conspiracy
that he indeed had the requisite intent to commit.79 Finally, the court
recognized the policy of avoiding injustice by illustrating that when a
lesser included offense is not allowed, the jury may be faced with the
choice of convicting a defendant on a greater conspiracy that he was not
a part of, or complete acquittal, neither of which may be the appropriate
outcome.80
D. Gilmore: Not Requiring Lesser Included Offense Instruction
In United States v. Gilmore, the Tenth Circuit reviewed a district
court’s decision denying defendant Jerry Gilmore’s request for a jury
instruction on a lesser included offense.81 He was a low-level agent in a
complicated hierarchical drug distribution organization.82
The
defendant admitted to sharing the drugs he received with friends and
admitted knowing he was transporting others to solicit drugs.83 The
Tenth Circuit held that the instruction for a lesser included offense was
not required where the dispute does not concern the elements that
differentiate the lesser and greater offenses.84 In other words, the
75. Id.at 29–30.
76. Id. at 29. The court refers to these types of conspiracies as vertical conspiracies. These
conspiracies involve members at the top making final decisions, and the lower members executing those
decisions. This is opposed to horizontal conspiracies, where the decision making is more equally shared
among the members. Ohlin, supra note 2, at 190, 192, 194.
77. Boidi, 568 F.3d at 29. The court does not elaborate on these advantages, but they can be
implied. There are perceived advantages in the admissibility of hearsay evidence and the admissibility
of coconspirator acts. Also, many defense attorneys would argue that conspiracies are more likely to
confuse the trier of fact to the advantage of the prosecutor. See Paul Marcus, Conspiracy: The Criminal
Agreement in Theory and in Practice, 65 GEO. L.J. 925, 940–41 (1977). In addition, “one of the more
common ways to use RICO is to charge a conspiracy to commit a RICO violation under 18 U.S.C.
[§] 1962(d)(2000).” Katyal, supra note 2, at n.112.
78. Boidi, 568 F.3d at 30.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Unites States v. Gilmore, 438 Fed. App’x 654, 655 (10th Cir. 2011).
82. Id. at 656.
83. Id. at 657.
84. Id. at 658.
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contested fact in dispute prong (the second prong) of the lesser included
offense analysis was not met. The court also found that the third prong
was not satisfied because a jury would not be able to reasonably convict
on the lesser conspiracy while acquitting of the greater.85
In finding that the second prong was not met, the court determined
that the elements differentiating the two offenses were not in dispute.86
Rather, the disputed issue was “whether Mr. Gilmore was a member of
the conspiracy or just a consumer.”87 Had the dispute been whether the
conspiracy’s goal was to distribute versus possess, the Tenth Circuit
would have allowed the instruction.88 Instead, the court determined that
the dispute was whether the defendant was involved in the only alleged
conspiracy, and the defendant was in essence asking for an instruction
on a completely different conspiracy from the one charged.89
According to the Tenth Circuit, the defendant also failed to prove the
third rational jury prong.90 A jury could not rationally convict on the
lesser conspiracy while acquitting on the greater because all of the
evidence demonstrated that distribution was central to the conspiracy.91
The court pointed to the fact that the defendant’s own testimony
expressed that he shared the drugs with friends, “which bears on the
distribution aspect of the conspiracy.”92 As a result, the defendant’s
convictions were affirmed in whole.93
III. LAPOINTE OPINION
James LaPointe was part of an oxycodone trafficking organization
that shipped pills from Florida to Tennessee.94 Dustin Wallace received
the pills in Tennessee and distributed them to buyers.95 Law
enforcement recordings showed LaPointe requesting oxycodone from
Wallace, discussing potential buyers, and addressing the possibility of
LaPointe selling Oxycontin to Wallace.96 At trial, LaPointe denied
involvement in the distribution conspiracy, explaining that the
conversations were intended to deceive Wallace into providing larger
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 657–58.
Id. at 658.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 661.
United States v. LaPointe, 690 F.3d 434, 438 (6th Cir. 2012).
Id.
Id.
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quantities of drugs for LaPointe’s personal use.97 LaPointe was charged
with conspiring to possess oxycodone with intent to distribute.98 At the
end of the trial, LaPointe requested a jury instruction on the lesser
included offense of conspiracy to possess.99 The district court denied
the instruction, and the court convicted LaPointe of conspiracy to
possess with intent to distribute.100 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit
reversed.101
The organization of the Sixth Circuit’s opinion differs from the First
and Tenth Circuits’ because it combines the analysis of the second
contested fact in dispute prong and the third rational jury prong.102
Rather than analyzing the two prongs separately, the court addressed
whether the conspiracy’s differentiating facts were in dispute in the
same step of its analysis of whether a reasonable jury could convict on
the lesser and not the greater conspiracy.103
The Sixth Circuit’s first step was to ask whether the elements of the
lesser conspiracy were included in the greater.104 The court declared
that it is well-settled that a conspiracy to possess is a lesser included
offense of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute.105 The Sixth
Circuit reasoned that the lower court placed too much emphasis on how
the indictment was drafted because the district court based its holding on
the idea that “[a]n offense can be charged conjunctively and proven
disjunctively.”106 A prior Sixth Circuit case had held that governments
have the right to charge in the conjunctive so the grand jury can find
probable cause for all of the alternative theories that go forward to
trial.107 “Juries, on the other hand, may convict a defendant on any
theory contained in the indictment. As a result, judges read jury

97. Id.
98. Id. He was also charged with attempt to possess oxycodone. Id. at 438–39.
99. Id. at 439.
100. Id. The conviction on attempt was affirmed. Id. at 444.
101. Id. at 444.
102. Compare id. at 439, with United States v. Boidi, 568 F.3d 24, 27 (1st Cir. 2009), and United
States v. Gilmore, 438 Fed. App’x 654, 657 (10th Cir. 2011) (LaPointe, the Sixth Circuit opinion,
combines the contested fact in dispute prong with the rational jury prong, while Boidi and Gilmore, the
First and Tenth Circuit opinions respectively, do not).
103. See LaPointe, 690 F.3d at 441–43.
104. Id. at 439–40.
105. Id. at 440 (citing Boidi, 568 F.3d at 28). Boidi cites to several cases that have “concluded or
assumed that a less serious conspiracy can be a lesser included offense of a similar but greater one.” Id.
See, e.g., Unites States v. Carroll, 140 F. App’x 168, 169 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam); United States v.
Ruhbayan, 406 F.3d 292, 295–96 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Vaandering, 50 F.3d 696, 703 (9th
Cir. 1995). For a list of several more, see Boidi, 568 F.3d at n.2.
106. LaPointe, 690 F.3d at 440 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
107. Id. (citing United States v. McAuliffe, 490 F.3d 526, 534 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v.
Cornell, 162 F. App’x 404, 415 (6th Cir. 2006)).
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instructions in the disjunctive.”108 The reasoning for this doctrine is for
societal reassurance in grand jury thoroughness, and that rationale does
not follow in the reasoning behind lesser included offense
instructions.109 At trial, the prosecution must only succeed on one of the
indictment’s theories, and not granting an appropriate lesser included
offense instruction would improperly place a greater burden on the
defendant.110
In the next step of the opinion, the Sixth Circuit held that evidence of
the element differentiating the two crimes would support a conviction on
the lesser offense and acquittal on the greater.111 The government
argued that the first prong was not met because no such lesser
conspiracy existed, and the only issue at trial was whether the defendant
was part of the conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute.112
According to the government, because the prosecution only presented
facts to show distribution, it was only alleging conspiracy to distribute.
The argument followed that the only objective of the conspiracy was to
distribute, and the objective of simple possession was not alleged.
Therefore, the government’s stance was that there could be no dispute as
to the differentiating elements because there was only one conspiracy:
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute.113
The Sixth Circuit reasoned that the government was inferring that
conspiracy can only have one objective, and then recognized that it is
well-settled law that a conspiracy can have multiple objectives.114 The
correct question for a court to ask is “whether there is ‘some core of
facts that is common to the scenario that the government sought to prove
and the one that the defendant claims to show only a lesser included
offense,’” and not whether the conspiracy would be an entirely different
charge.115 In LaPointe, the only differentiating fact was whether the
defendant shared the intent to distribute as part of the conspiracy.116
The government is required to show that the defendant was more than
just active in the conspiracy; it “must separately prove a defendant’s
intention to join each objective of the conspiracy.”117 In conclusion,
because common core facts can prove the lesser and greater
conspiracies, the lower court erred in not granting the instruction, and
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

LaPointe, 690 F.3d at 440 (citing Cornell, 162 F. App’x at 415).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 441.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Ingram, 360 U.S. at 670).
Id. at 441 (quoting Boidi, 568 F.3d at 28).
Id. at 441–42.
Id. at 442.
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therefore the Sixth Circuit reversed the pertinent conspiracy counts.118
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Conspiracies Can Have Multiple Objectives
Although the Sixth Circuit was correct that conspiracies have
multiple objectives, it mischaracterized the government and the Tenth
Circuit’s argument. In Boidi, Gilmore, and LaPointe, the government
essentially argued that the elements differentiating the lesser and greater
conspiracies were not in dispute because conspiracy to possess with
intent to distribute was the only charged offense.119 According to the
government, any proposed agreement to simply possess is a totally
separate agreement, and no dispute between agreements existed because
no agreement to simply possess was charged or proven.120 In LaPointe,
the government asserted that “no evidence supports a conviction for
conspiracy to possess because there was no such conspiracy. The only
conspiracy [the defendant] could join was the one . . . to distribute
drugs.”121
The Sixth Circuit inaccurately characterized the
government’s position as an implication “that a conspiracy may only
have one objective rather than multiple.”122 Although this “multiple
objective” aspect of conspiracy is extremely important to understand
how to correctly enforce the law, the Sixth Circuit’s characterization of
the government’s (and by implication the Tenth Circuit’s) understanding
of this issue is misleading.123 This Part of the Casenote first discusses
the importance of the multiple objective aspect of conspiracy and then
addresses why the Tenth Circuit’s position is not as simple as the Sixth
Circuit interpreted it.
1. The Sixth Circuit Correctly Analyzes Conspiracies’ Multiple
Objectives
Despite the mischaracterization of the government and the Tenth
Circuit’s argument, the Sixth Circuit correctly focused on the “multiple
objective” aspect of conspiracy. As the court pointed out, the
understanding of conspiracy is well-settled, as the Supreme Court ruled
118. Id. at 443.
119. Id. at 441; United States v. Boidi, 568 F.3d 24, 28 (1st Cir. 2009); Unites States v. Gilmore,
438 Fed. App’x 654, 657–58 (10th Cir. 2011).
120. LaPointe, 690 F.3d at 441; Boidi, 568 F.3d at 28; Gilmore, 438 Fed. App’x at 657–58.
121. LaPointe, 690 F.3d at 441.
122. Id. at 441.
123. See generally id.
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on the issue in Rabinowich and Ingram.124 Rabinowich held that “a
single conspiracy might have for its object the violation of two or more
criminal laws . . . ” even if the time limits of the substantive offenses
vary.125 This understanding is partly rooted in the policy behind
conspiracy. As Rabinowich describes it:
For two or more to confederate and combine together to commit or cause
to be committed a breach of the criminal laws, is an offense of the gravest
character, sometimes quite outweighing, in injury to the public, the mere
commission of the contemplated crime. It involves deliberate plotting to
subvert the laws, educating and preparing the conspirators for further and
habitual criminal practices. And it is characterized by secrecy, rendering
it difficult of detection, requiring more time for its discovery, and adding
126
to the importance of punishing it when discovered.

The fact that a defendant agreed to commit a lesser substantive offense
required to commit the overall offense does not degrade the effects that
Rabinowich details.127 An agreement to aid in the possession of drugs
still helps conspirators commit future crimes, “is characterized by
secrecy,” and is much harder to prevent than the simple apprehension of
a lone actor.128 In Ingram, the Supreme Court expanded upon
Rabinowich to solidify the understanding that a conspiracy may have
multiple objectives and reinforced the idea that enhanced dangers of
conspiracy are still present when a defendant conspires to commit a
minor objective.129 The heightened danger of conspiracy exists whether
the defendant agrees to distribute the drugs or simply possess them.130
Further, the agreement to possess aids the efficiency of the agreement of
the greater conspiracy to distribute.131 For these reasons, a defendant
who is part of a larger conspiracy only because of his agreement to a
smaller objective needed to facilitate the larger conspiracy is still
considered a member of the conspiracy.132 If the defendant who only
agreed to a lesser objective is still part of the conspiracy, it naturally
follows that the lesser conspiracy is a lesser included offense in the
124. United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 86 (1915); Ingram v. United States, 360 U.S. 672,
677–80 (1959).
125. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. at 86.
126. Id. at 88 (emphasis added).
127. See id. at 86, 88.
128. See id. at 88.
129. See Ingram, 360 U.S. at 679–80.
130. See Rabinowich, 238 U.S. at 86, 88.
131. See Ohlin, supra note 2, at 169–70; Katyal, supra note 2, at 1309–10.
132. See Rabinowich, 238 U.S. at 86; Ingram, 360 U.S. at 678; United States v. LaPointe, 690
F.3d 434, 441 (6th Cir. 2012). This does not mean that such a defendant should be guilty of the overall
conspiracy. Rather, they should be guilty of a lesser conspiracy. Intent is still required, and the
defendant has intent for the lesser, not the greater conspiracy. Supra text accompanying notes 14–19.
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greater conspiracy, not a separate offense, as the Tenth Circuit
asserted.133
Applying this understanding to the lesser included offense prongs, the
multiple objective analysis described above can address whether
elements differentiating the greater and lesser conspiracies are in
dispute.134 The Tenth Circuit held that there was no dispute in the
contested facts that differentiated the lesser and greater offenses, so the
second contested fact in dispute prong was not met.135 To determine
this, the court adopted the government’s argument that because there
was only one conspiracy alleged (the conspiracy to possess with intent
to distribute), and this was the only objective charged.136 According to
the Tenth Circuit, the dispute in facts between the government and the
defendant was whether the defendant committed the greater charged
conspiracy, or committed no conspiracy at all.137 “Because the dispute
was not about the objective of the charged conspiracy,” there was no
contested fact between a lesser and greater offense.138
The Sixth Circuit held that because a conspiracy can have multiple
objectives, and because possession is a lesser objective within
distribution, the lesser conspiracy in LaPointe was within the greater.139
That being said, it does not necessarily follow that a lesser conspiracy is
always included within a greater. A lesser conspiracy instruction may
not be granted if the lesser included offense is based on separate facts
than the greater conspiracy charged.140 For example, a defendant’s
instruction request should be denied “[i]f the government charges and
seeks to prove a conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute heroin in
New York in 2005 but the evidence arguably showed only a conspiracy
to possess in San Francisco in 2007.”141 For this reason, the Sixth
Circuit did not ask whether the different conspiracy was a separate
crime. Instead, the court inquired “whether there [was] ‘some core of
facts . . . common to the scenario that the government sought to prove
and one that the defendant claim[ed] to show . . . .’”142

133. See LaPointe, 690 F.3d at 441; Unites States v. Gilmore, 438 Fed. App’x 654, 657–58 (10th
Cir. 2011). This concept that a conspiracy can have multiple objectives has its limits. Kotteakos v.
United States held that “separate adventures of like character” cannot be put together in the same
enterprise. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 769 (1946).
134. LaPointe, 690 F.3d at 441–42.
135. See Gilmore, 438 Fed. App’x at 658.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. LaPointe, 690 F.3d at 441–42.
140. See id. at 441 (quoting United States v. Garcia, 27 F.3d 1009, 1015 (5th Cir. 1994)).
141. United States v. Boidi, 568 F.3d 24, 28 (1st Cir. 2009).
142. LaPointe, 690 F.3d at 441 (quoting Boidi, 568 F.3d at 28).
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In asking whether the core facts of the conspiracies overlap, the court
focused on the nature of the objectives of the conspiracy to see if the
lesser objective was actually consumed in the greater objective of the
conspiracy.143 If the facts overlap, then a defendant only agreeing to a
lesser objective in a greater conspiracy still perpetrates the dangers that
Rabinowich sought to avoid and should be held accountable for his
agreement.144 For instance, if a defendant agrees to possess drugs for
the purpose of completing the primary objective of distribution, then
that defendant is making the commission of the crime more efficient,
facilitating the criminal education of co-conspirators, and furthering the
secrecy of the crime.145 The policy behind conspiracy law necessitates
treating this as one conspiracy.146 If the core facts that the prosecution
asserts to prove conspiracy to distribute can also prove conspiracy to
possess, the lesser conspiracy to possess is inherently included in the
greater conspiracy to distribute, and the defendant may request a lesser
included offense instruction.147 The defendant’s guilt of the lesser or
greater conspiracy turns on which objective the defendant agreed to,
intended, and had knowledge of.148 If the facts do not overlap, then the
court is faced with two separate conspiracies, and the Tenth Circuit’s
approach would be correct.149
2. The Sixth Circuit Mischaracterizes the Tenth Circuit’s Understanding
of Multiple Objectives
The Sixth Circuit stated that the Tenth Circuit’s and the government’s
arguments “implie[d] that conspiracy may have only one objective.”150
Although the Tenth Circuit did not adequately account for the “multiple
objective” character of conspiracy, it is unlikely that the court
consciously disregarded settled law on the issue.151 More likely, the
Tenth Circuit confused the second contested fact in dispute prong with
the third rational jury prong.152

143. See LaPointe, 690 F.3d at 441–42.
144. See id; United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 88 (1915).
145. See Rabinowich, 238 U.S. at 88; Ohlin, supra note 2, at 169–70; Katyal, supra note 2, at
1309–10.
146. See LaPointe, 690 F.3d at 441–42.
147. See id.
148. See United Stated v. Turner, 319 F.3d 716, 721 (5th Cir. 2003).
149. See LaPointe, 690 F.3d at 441; supra text accompanying notes 140–141. See generally
United States v. Gilmore, 438 Fed. App’x 654 (10th Cir. 2011).
150. LaPointe, 690 F.3d at 441.
151. E.g., United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 86 (1915); Ingram v. United States, 360 U.S.
672, 678–79 (1959). See generally, Gilmore, 438 Fed. App’x 654.
152. See generally, Gilmore, 438 Fed. App’x at 657–58.
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First, it should be noted that, on its facts, it is possible that Gilmore
reached the correct conclusion. Even if the Tenth Circuit properly
applied the second and third prongs, it could still have found against
Gilmore and affirmed the denial of the instruction.153 It could be argued
that the facts of Gilmore are distinguishable from Boidi and LaPointe to
the extent that a rational jury in Gilmore could be less able to reasonably
convict on the lesser conspiracy and acquit on the greater.154 The
government possessed more evidence indicating the defendant’s
knowledge of, and intent to join, the conspiracy to distribute.155 For
instance, Gilmore repeatedly transported a drug dealer to distribute
drugs to customers and even collected money from customers on one
occasion.156 This evidence could be extremely indicative of intent to
conspire to distribute, although it would not necessitate such a
finding.157 The evidence of shared intent was less clear in Boidi and
LaPointe. In Boidi, the defendant had shared the drugs with friends and
talked about diluting the drugs for potential distribution, but these facts
did not demand a finding that Boidi agreed to join a conspiracy to
distribute.158 In LaPointe, a reasonable jury could find that although
LaPointe requested drugs for distribution, he was actually deceiving the
dealer to give him drugs on credit for his own use.159
Although this distinction may justify the Tenth Circuit’s result based
on the third rational jury prong of the lesser included offense analysis, it
should not be applied to the second contested fact in dispute prong.160
When analyzing whether a contested fact may separate the two offenses,
the Tenth Circuit should have focused only on whether the evidence
proved the lesser conspiracy minus one element (that being the intent to
conspire to distribute).161 To answer the second contested fact in
dispute prong, the court should have only asked whether the facts
presented could show that Gilmore conspired to possess, no matter what
the additional facts were that the prosecution put forth to prove
conspiracy to distribute.162 The likelihood that Gilmore actually
153. See generally id. at 655–57.
154. Compare id., with United States v. Boidi, 568 F.3d 24, 25–26 (1st Cir. 2009), and LaPointe,
690 F.3d at 438 (In Gilmore, the facts make it less likely than in Boidi and LaPointe that the defendant
was only guilty of conspiracy to possess, rather than conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute).
155. Gilmore, 438 Fed. App’x at 656.
156. Id.
157. See id.; Boidi, 568 F.3d at 29 (holding that the substantive act and knowledge of the greater
objective does not require a finding of intent to commit the greater conspiracy).
158. Boidi, 568 F.3d at 26. Keep in mind the difference between committing a substantive crime
and a conspiracy to commit that crime. See supra text accompanying notes 26–29.
159. See LaPointe, 690 F.3d at 438.
160. See generally Gilmore, 438 Fed. App’x at 657–58.
161. See Boidi, 568 F.3d at 28–29.
162. See id.
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conspired to distribute had no bearing on whether Gilmore disputed a
fact that would determine whether he was guilty of conspiracy to
distribute.163 The court should not have focused on the likelihood that
the facts may or may not have proven that element.164
The question of likelihood is reserved for the third rational jury
prong. This third prong asks whether “the evidence would permit a jury
to rationally find [the defendant] guilty of the lesser included offense
and acquit him of the greater.”165 In regard to conspiracy, the second
contested fact in dispute prong asks: Does the defendant dispute a fact
that determines whether he is guilty of the lesser or greater
conspiracy?166 Part of the analysis of this question lies in whether the
lesser and greater conspiracies are rooted in the same core facts.167 This
question is not the same as whether the evidence would allow a rational
jury to convict on the lesser conspiracy but not the greater.168
Incorrectly applying the rational jury prong analysis to the second
contested fact in dispute prong may lead to incorrect results in future
cases.169 Future courts adopting the Tenth Circuit approach could deny
a lesser included offense instruction on facts that resemble Boidi and
LaPointe where a jury could reasonably convict on the lesser and acquit
on the greater.170 If the evidence infers that the defendant conspired to
distribute, but does not necessitate that finding, a court could use the
Tenth Circuit’s opinion in Gilmore to deny an instruction based on the
idea that the defendant is alleging an entirely different offense and not a
contested fact in dispute.171 This court would find against the
defendant’s request for an instruction before even addressing the
rational jury prong.172 Strict adherence to prong application is vital
because of the complex nature of conspiracy.173 Without courts’
relentless attention to detail, the intent requirement of conspiracy can
become even more confused, resulting in unjust outcomes, as described
below in Parts B and C.174
When the Sixth Circuit described the Tenth Circuit’s holding as one
that simply ignores the concept that conspiracy can have multiple
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

See id. See generally Gilmore, 438 Fed. App’x at 655–59.
See Boidi, 568 F.3d at 28–31.
Id. at 27 (alteration in original) (quoting Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 208 (1973)).
See Boidi, 568 F.3d at 28.
See supra text accompanying notes 140–141.
See Boidi, 568 F.3d at 27.
See generally id.
See generally id. at 25–26; United States v. LaPointe, 690 F.3d 434, 438 (6th Cir. 2012).
See generally United States v. Gilmore, 438 Fed. App’x 654, 657–58 (10th Cir. 2011).
See generally id.
See Boidi, 568 F.3d at 30.
See infra Part IV.B–C.
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objectives, the Sixth Circuit missed the opportunity to correct the true
misunderstanding of the Tenth Circuit.
The Sixth Circuit’s
misunderstanding of the nature of the split set the opinion back.175 The
court should have explained that the Tenth Circuit inappropriately
combined the second contested facts in dispute prong with the rational
jury prong. The LaPointe opinion should have demonstrated the
difference between asking whether the defendant disputes a fact that
distinguished the lesser and greater conspiracies (second contested fact
in dispute prong) and whether a jury could rationally convict on the
lesser but not the greater conspiracy (third prong).176 The Sixth Circuit
failed to use LaPointe to clarify the correct lesser included instruction
analysis, and as a result, failed to provide adequate guidance to future
courts addressing this complex issue.
B. Requiring Intent for the Correct Conspiracy
Although the Sixth Circuit accurately applies the intent requirement
for conspiracy, the court does not adequately address the intent element
to distinguish itself from the Tenth Circuit and provide guidance to other
courts.177 To be eligible for a lesser included offense instruction, the
jury must be able to rationally convict on the lesser offense while
acquitting of the greater, among other factors described above.178 For a
jury to convict on any conspiracy, lesser or greater, the jury must find
intent to join the alleged conspiracy, among other factors.179 Two mens
rea issues can serve as red herrings of intent to conspire: intent to
commit the substantive offense and knowledge of the conspiracy.180
Neither can be equated to intent to conspire, and neither compels a
finding of such intent.181
1. The Tenth Circuit Misunderstands the Intent Requirement of
Conspiracy
It is possible for a court to treat two conspiracies as separate crimes
and still achieve the goal of punishing the conspirator who agreed to a
lesser objective by convicting him on the greater conspiracy.182 This is
175.
176.
177.
178.
note 38.
179.
180.
181.
182.

See generally LaPointe, 690 F.3d at 441.
See supra text accompanying notes 160–168.
See generally LaPointe, 690 F.3d at 439–443.
LaPointe, 690 F.3d at 439 (quoting Colon, 268 F.3d at 373); see supra text accompanying
United Stated v. Turner, 319 F.3d 716, 721 (5th Cir. 2003).
See United States v. Boidi, 568 F.3d 24, 30 (1st Cir. 2009).
See id.
E.g., Unites States v. Gilmore, 438 Fed. App’x 654, 657 (10th Cir. 2011).
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indeed what happened in Gilmore.183 Although the ends seem to
comport with the underlying policy goal of conspiracy laws, this
approach is an inadequate application of intent to conspire. Conviction
under conspiracy requires at least the degree of intent to commit the
substantive crime.184 If the defendant only truly intended to join a
conspiracy to commit a lesser objective, he did not possess the intent
required to commit the greater conspiracy. While conviction on the
greater conspiracy punishes the general membership to the conspiracy, it
over convicts a defendant who did not intend to join a greater
conspiracy, trampling the standard of mens rea in American criminal
law.185
Intent to join a conspiracy can be easily confused with intent to
commit the underlying substantive crime.186 In Boidi, the First Circuit
recognized that the defendant “clearly possesse[d] cocaine with intent to
distribute,” but that does not necessitate a finding that the defendant
conspired to distribute drugs.187 Situations may easily arise in which a
defendant may commit an act, such as distribution, without agreeing or
conspiring to do such an act, and a court may mistake the intent to do
the act for intent to conspire.188
The Tenth Circuit fell into this trap. Although some of Gilmore’s
facts may be argued to indicate intent to conspire to distribute drugs, the
court focused too much on the defendant’s clear intent to distribute.189
The court cited the defendant’s own testimony when it asserted “that he
obtained methamphetamine from [other conspirators] and ‘shared’ that
methamphetamine with friends, which bears on the distribution aspect of
conspiracy.”190 As discussed earlier, conspiracy laws have a purpose
wholly separate from the punishment of the underlying offense, and the
Tenth Circuit ignored this by affirming the conviction for conspiracy
based on intent to commit the substantive offense.191 Although intent to
commit a substantive crime may infer intent to conspire, that fact does
not compel that finding, as the Tenth Circuit implies in Gilmore.192
The Tenth Circuit also appears to have inaccurately equated
183. Id.
184. Ingram v. United States, 360 U.S. 672, 678 (1959) (quoting Developments in the Law of
Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L. REV. 920, 939 (1959)).
185. See Id. at 678–79.
186. See United States v. Boidi, 568 F.3d 24, 29 (1st Cir. 2009). E.g., Gilmore, 438 Fed. App’x at
658.
187. Boidi, 568 F.3d at 29.
188. Id.
189. Gilmore, 438 Fed. App’x at 658.
190. Id.
191. See United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 88 (1915).
192. See Boidi, 568 F.3d at 29–30. See generally Gilmore, 438 Fed. App’x at 657–58.
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knowledge of a conspiracy with intent to commit such conspiracy.193
To prove intent, the government must prove the defendant has
knowledge of the conspiracy, but it does not automatically follow that
intent to join the conspiracy is necessarily implied from knowledge that
the conspiracy exists.194 Knowledge may bear on intent, but a
reasonable jury could find that a defendant with knowledge of a
conspiracy of an offense, and who committed that underlying offense,
did not have the requisite intent to join the conspiracy.195 “Evidence
that a buyer intends to resell the product instead of personally
consuming it does not necessarily establish that the buyer has joined the
seller’s distribution conspiracy. This is so even if the seller is aware of
the buyer’s intent to resell.”196 In Boidi, the First Circuit accurately
addressed the concerns with the confusion among intent to commit the
substantive act, knowledge of the conspiracy, and intent to conspire, but
the Sixth Circuit did not follow that lead.197
2. The Sixth Circuit Does Not Adequately Address Intent or the Tenth
Circuit’s Misunderstanding
The First Circuit clearly recognized the inherent issues that may arise
with intent in conspiracy.198 First, the court accurately parsed out the
intent to commit the underlying crime from the intent to commit the
conspiracy.199
Second, that court understood that while simple
knowledge of co-conspirators’ acts may “permit a jury to infer . . . an
agreement,” that knowledge does not compel such a finding.200
The Sixth Circuit did not fully address the tenuous issue of intent
required to convict on conspiracy.201 Rather, to determine whether the
evidence could reasonably support a conviction on the lesser offense and
not the greater, the court focused on the overlapping core facts.202 The
court did point out that the only differentiating fact between the two
conspiracies would be the intent to distribute and stated that “[t]he
prosecution must separately prove a defendant’s intention to join each
193. Gilmore, 438 Fed. App’x at 657–58.
194. See Ingram v. United States, 360 U.S. 672, 677–78 (1959) (citing Direct Sales Co. v. United
States, 319 U.S. 703, 711–12 (1943)); Boidi, 568 F.3d at 30 (citing Direct Sales, 319 U.S. at 711).
195. See Boidi, 568 F.3d at 29–30.
196. Boidi, 568 F.3d at 30 (quoting United States v. Hawkins, 547 F.3d 66, 74 (2d Cir. 2008)).
197. See Boidi, 568 F.3d at 30.
198. See id.
199. Id. at 29.
200. Id. at 29–30 (citing Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703, 711(1943)) (emphasis in
original).
201. See generally United States v. LaPointe, 690 F.3d 434, 439–43 (6th Cir. 2012).
202. Id. at 441.
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objective of the conspiracy.”203 But this brief analysis of intent failed to
point out the understandable confusion that courts have between intent
to commit conspiracy and intent to commit the substantive act.204 The
Sixth Circuit also neglected to point out that knowledge of a conspiracy
does not necessitate intent.205 Not including these aspects does not
necessarily make the Sixth Circuit’s application and analysis flawed, but
their inclusion could have aided future courts to better understand the
true flaws in the Tenth Circuit’s decision and enforce the need for lesser
included conspiracies in such instances. Clarification on this complex
issue is dire, and the Sixth Circuit missed its chance to provide adequate
guidance.
C. Avoiding Injustice
The Sixth Circuit reached a result that protected against injustice in
LaPointe but did not adequately emphasize lesser included instructions’
underlying policy of avoiding injustice to help future courts reach proper
results.206 A major, if not primary, reason lesser included instructions
are allowed is to ensure that the jury does not “stretch to convict the
defendant of the greater crime.”207 This danger arises when the jury
may not be convinced that the prosecution has proved its presented
charge, but still believes the defendant committed an illegal act.208 It is
likely that the jury may consider the conviction on the greater charge to
be a lesser evil when compared to acquittal.209 A lesser included offense
instruction removes from the jury the choice between two wrongs and
allows a conviction on the true acts of the defendant, leading to a truer
sense of justice.210 The Supreme Court has reinforced on multiple
occasions the concept that a “third option” should be given to the jury to
escape an “unwarranted conviction” of the defendant.211
203. Id. at 442.
204. See generally id. at 441–43.
205. See generally id. at 441–43.
206. See generally LaPointe, 690 F.3d at 439–43.
207. United States v. Boidi, 568 F.3d 24, 30 (1st Cir. 2009) (citing United States v. Flores, 968
F.2d 1366, 1369 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. Balthazard, 360 F.3d 309, 320 (1st Cir. 2004)).
208. Flores, 968 F.2d at 1369.
209. See id.
210. See id.
211. Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637 (1980); Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 646 (1991);
Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 208 (1973). This “third option” is not solely a pro-defendant
concept. It can work in the favor of the prosecution. Certain jury pools may be more likely to acquit
than convict of the charged conspiracy if the prosecution is unable to prove the necessary elements of
the charged crime, even if the jury believes the defendant is guilty of a lesser crime. In this scenario the
prosecution may want to adopt the defense’s position in LaPointe to save a conviction by allowing a
lesser included offense instruction to avoid acquittal.
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The need to allow a lesser included offense instruction becomes more
necessary when considering a charge of conspiracy.212 As explained
above, intent to commit the substantive act can be easily confused with
intent to conspire, and the intent to agree to a lesser objective within the
conspiracy may be muddled as well.213 Allowing the lesser included
offense instruction ensures that the prosecution proves the exact intent
that is alleged to receive a conviction on the charged conspiracy.214
The need for proper lesser included offense instructions cannot be
overstated. First, conspiracy to simply possess is a misdemeanor and
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute is a felony under federal
law.215 This alone can lead to drastic sentencing variations that could
solely depend on whether the lesser included instruction is allowed.
Secondly, a ruling on the issue can have implications far beyond the
charged conspiracy.216 In Boidi, the lower court’s refusal to grant the
instruction not only affected the conspiracy, but also convictions that
required felony conspiracy as a predicate act.217 The First Circuit did
find that despite the lower court’s error, there were still enough
convictions on predicate acts to support the RICO conviction, but it
vacated the defendant’s “use of a communication facility to facilitate a
drug crime” charge.218
The fact that the prosecution may gain “atmospheric advantages”
from charging a conspiracy as opposed to a substantive crime requires
courts to pay strict attention to jury instructions during conspiracy cases
to ensure the appropriate adjudication.219 In Boidi, the First Circuit
realized that the government could have easily charged the defendant
with the substantive crime without sacrificing the severity of the
sentence for that particular offense.220 Instead, the government charged
conspiracy to gain advantages in RICO and communication facility
charges.221 For this reason, combined with the tenuous nature of intent
in criminal conspiracy, “[t]he use of conspiracy doctrine in a vertical
context has caused courts unease” and should lead all the circuits to be
212. See United States v. Boidi, 568 F.3d 24, 30 (1st Cir. 2009).
213. Id. at 29–30; see supra Part IV.B.
214. See Boidi, 568 F.3d at 30.
215. Id. at 31–32 (citing 21 U.S.C. §§ 843(b), 802(13); United States v. Baggett, 890 F.2d 1095,
1098 (10th Cir. 1989)).
216. See Boidi, 568 F.3d at 31.
217. Id.
218. Id. (“In the indictment, the communications facility charge was tied to the conspiracy count,
and the district court instructed the jury that it had to find that Boidi knowingly and intentionally used a
communications facility to cause or facilitate the drug trafficking offense in count 5 (the conspiracy)”).
Id.
219. See supra note 77.
220. Boidi, 568 F.3d at 29.
221. Id. at 29, 31; see supra note 77.
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especially skeptical to ensure the avoidance of injustice.222
Despite the First Circuit’s explanation of all of the potential unjust
results that could arise from mistreatment of the lesser included
conspiracy issue in Boidi, the Tenth Circuit completely ignored the
issue.223 The Tenth Circuit’s strict and terse approach to application of
the lesser included offense prongs failed to take into account the
nuanced reasons that a lesser included offense instruction is allowed and
how those reasons are amplified by conspiracy’s unusual nature.224 The
Sixth Circuit took a step in the right direction, as it referenced the desire
to avoid “unwarranted conviction[s]” in its general discussion of lesser
included offense instructions.225 Unfortunately, the LaPointe opinion
failed to go far enough to fully distinguish itself from Gilmore.
Probably as a result of its failure to address the difficulties in proving
intent of lesser and greater conspiracies, the Sixth Circuit was unable to
point out the particularly unjust outcomes that could result from a
misunderstanding of the lesser included offense instruction in
conspiracy cases.226 Although the court claimed to follow the First
Circuit’s model for the issue, the Sixth Circuit only truly adhered to one
concept, that the core facts of the two conspiracies must overlap.227
Although this point is important, it does not communicate the necessity
for a liberal approach to allowing lesser included offense instructions in
conspiracy cases. A more in-depth recognition of how the application of
this issue can lead to grossly unjust results on the one hand, and true
justice on the other, would have more adequately met this goal.
V. CONCLUSION
The Sixth Circuit may have arrived at the correct outcome in its
disposition, but it incorrectly analyzed the nature of the circuit split and
did not fully address all of the reasons that the Tenth Circuit reached the
incorrect result.228 While the Sixth Circuit demonstrated an adept
understanding of the concept that conspiracies can have multiple
objectives and how that affects lesser included instructions, the court
failed to correctly characterize the Tenth Circuit’s stance on the issue

222. Boidi, 568 F.3d at 29.
223. Id. at 29–30. See generally United States v. Gilmore, 438 Fed. App’x 654, 657–58 (10th Cir.
2011).
224. See Boidi, 568 F.3d at 29–31. See generally Gilmore, 438 Fed. App’x at 657–58.
225. United States v. LaPointe, 690 F.3d 434, 439 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Beck v. Alabama, 447
U.S. 625, 637 (1980)).
226. See generally LaPointe, 690 F.3d at 439–43.
227. See id at 441.
228. See generally id at 439–43; Gilmore, 438 Fed. App’x at 658.
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and missed an opportunity to truly differentiate itself from Gilmore.229
The tenuous nature of the intent element in criminal conspiracy laws
makes its application to lesser included conspiracy all the more
important, and the LaPointe opinion did not fully analyze that concept to
highlight Gilmore’s avoidance of the issue.230 Finally, in briefly
addressing the overall justice concerns that lie behind the concept of
lesser included offenses, the Sixth Circuit missed another chance to
more adequately distance itself from the Tenth Circuit’s opinion in
Gilmore.231
When the Sixth Circuit is presented with the lesser included
conspiracy question again, the court should definitively delineate the
differences between the second contested fact in dispute prong and the
third rational jury prong of the lesser included offense analysis. In
addition, the court needs to solidify conspiracy laws’ intent requirement
and reinforce the purpose of avoiding injustice when addressing this
topic. This will ensure that future courts more equitably distribute
justice when dealing with this complicated conspiracy issue.

229. See LaPointe, 690 F.3d at 441. See generally Gilmore, 438 Fed. App’x at 657–58.
230. See generally LaPointe, 690 F.3d at 439–43; Gilmore, 438 Fed. App’x at 657–58.
231. See LaPointe, 690 F.3d at 439 (quoting Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637 (1980)). See
generally Gilmore, 438 Fed. App’x at 657–58.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2014

25

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 6

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol82/iss1/6

26

